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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of entry of non-banks (termed Inde-
pendent Service Operators, ISOs) into ATM markets. We compare two
different regimes by which the ISO may generate income: i) The ISO
receives interchange fees and ii) the ISO charges consumers directly.
We find that due to the entry of an ISO the size of the total ATM net-
work increases independent of the way the ISO is financed. Account
fees increase if the ISO receives interchange fees and decrease if the
ISO charges consumers directly. Consumers may not benefit from the
entry of the ISO. If a regulator can control the interchange fee, entry by
an ISO financed through interchange fees increases consumer surplus,
while the entry of a surcharging ISO decreases consumer surplus.
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1 Introduction
Until several years ago ATM services were only provided by banks. Re-
cently, however, the entry of non-banks or so-called independent service
operators (ISOs) can be observed. These ISOs provide withdrawal services
at ATMs without offering further banking services. The issue of entry in
ATM markets has received attention by policymakers. For instance, in the
UK, the Cruickshank report1 (Cruickshank, 2000) criticizes that entry in
the ATM business is not free: until recently, the shared network operator
(LINK) has refused non-banks to become members. Following this investi-
gation and upon Government pressure LINK has now allowed ISOs to enter
the shared network. Since then the number of ATMs provided by ISOs has
steadily increased and as of 2009 a share of roughly 40% of the total UK
ATM network is operated by ISOs. Figure 1 displays the number of ATM
operated by banks and non-banks from 1998 to 2009.2 During this period
the number of ATMs owned by non-banks has sharply increased, peaked in
2007 and then slightly decreased thereafter. The number of ATMs provided
by banks has slightly increased over this time period. Similar developments
took place in other countries, for instance, in Canada and in the US (Croft
and Spencer, 2004).
The economics literature has largely neglected the entry of non-banks in
ATM markets. The present paper tries to fill this gap and provide insights
of the consequences of ISO entry. Does the overall ATM network increase?
What happens to bank profits? Do consumers benefit from the entry of the
ISO? And, as the markets for banking services and ATM services are interre-
lated, do account fees rise or fall with the entry of an additional competitor
in the ATM business?
We try to provide answers to the questions above. For this task we set up
a simple model. Following recent contributions a key ingredient is that the
1The Cruickshank report analyzes the competitiveness of the UK banking sector. Among
others, one part was concerned with the ATM sector.
2The data for the figure has been provided by LINK. Unfortunately, LINK does not distin-
guish between ATMs owned by banks and non-banks, but distinguishes between charging
and free machines. As the majority of banks have free ATMs and the majority of ISOs have
charging machines, we can take these data as proxies. The volume of cash withdrawals at
ATMs owned by ISOs is considerably lower and varies between 3 and 4% of the total volume
of withdrawals.
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Figure 1: ATM investment in the UK by banks and non-banks
markets for banking and ATM services are interrelated. One consequence
is that interchange fees may act as a collusive device (Matutes and Padilla,
1994; Donze and Dubec, 2006, 2009; Chioveanu et al., 2009). In our model,
there are two banks and one ISO. Banks offer general banking services (cur-
rent accounts, deposit and credit services, etc.) and cash withdrawals at
ATMs. The ISO only provides ATM services. The main features of our
model are in line with the present situation in the UK: There is a shared
network in which all players (banks and non-banks) participate. Foreign
withdrawals at ATMs owned by banks are free of charge for all consumers.
There is, however, an interchange fee from the cardholder’s bank to the ATM
owner. The ISO directly charges consumers for using their ATMs. In addi-
tion, we study an alternative regime where the ISO receives interchange fees
from the card issuer and there are no direct charges for consumers. We use
this setup to study the impact of ISO entry on the size of the ATM network,
account fees, profits and consumer surplus.
We find that the size of the ATM network increases due to the entry of the
ISO independent of whether the ISO charges consumers directly or receives
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interchange fees. Which of the two regimes leads to a larger network de-
pends on the interchange fee. If the interchange fee is rather low, the regime
with direct charging leads to a larger network (and the ISO provides the
significant larger share of the network). In contrast, if the interchange fee is
high, there is more investment in the network when the ISO receives inter-
change fees.
As the markets for banking services and ATM services are linked, the entry
of an ISO affects prices for banking services. In the regime where the ISO
receives interchange fees the entry of the ISO leads to higher account fees.
The reason is a cost-raising argument. Withdrawals at ATMs owned by the
ISO are costs for banks in form of interchange payments to the ISO. These
costs are passed through to customers and hence account fees rise. This
effect is not present in the regime with direct charging. In this case account
fees fall as the ISO enters. The reason here is that the market share of banks
in the ATM network shrinks and therefore the collusive effect of interchange
fees in a shared network becomes smaller.
The model presents a novel reason why banks may coordinate on high inter-
change fees: High interchange fees can be used to deter entry of non-banks.
The existing literature emphasizes the collusive effects of interchange fees
(e.g., Donze and Dubec, 2006): with high interchange fees, banks have less
incentive to compete tough for customers as banks can earn significant rev-
enues from non-customers via foreign withdrawals. In consequence, ac-
count fees (or prices for banking services in general) are high. In our model,
high interchange fees may deter entry by the ISO in the case the ISO is fi-
nanced by direct charges. High interchange fees induce so much investment
by banks such that any investment by the ISO is crowded out. In addition,
our model can explain why network operators such as LINK who are typi-
cally controlled by banks oppose ISOs to becoming members. Irrespective
of the way the ISO generates revenues, bank profits decrease upon ISO en-
try.
In this context, the relevant policy question is whether the entry of an ISO
is beneficial for consumers. We find that consumers may not always benefit
from ISO entry even though the size of the total ATM network increases.
In the regime where the ISO receives interchange fees this is opposed by
higher account fees. If the increase in account fees is large enough con-
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sumers may be worse off due to ISO entry. The trade-offs are different in the
regime where the ISO directly charges consumers. In addition to the larger
network consumers benefit from lower account fees. However, consumers
have to pay for the ATM use directly. Again, the overall impact of ISO entry
is ambiguous and consumer may be worse off due to ISO entry. These re-
sults have been established under the assumption that the interchange fee
is exogenously given.
In case a regulator can set the interchange fee, all ambiguity vanishes: The
entry of an ISO financed through interchange fees increases consumer sur-
plus and the entry of a surcharging ISO hurts consumers. Hence, if a regu-
lator wants to induce ISO entry and is able to optimally set the interchange
fee, the regime based on interchange fees is preferable. The key for this
result lies in the fact that in the case of an interchange fee based ISO the
trade-off between investment incentives and high account fees can be opti-
mally balanced while ATM consumption behavior is at the efficient level. In
case of a surcharge-based regime this is not the case and ATM consumption
is too low as surcharging distorts this decision. In consequence, consumers
are worse off.3
The literature on ATMs has been growing in recent years.4 A lot of attention
has been focused on the impact of ATM competition in various regimes. For
instance, Donze and Dubec (2006) and Chioveanu et al. (2009) study invest-
ment and pricing in a regime based on interchange fees. Direct charging
regimes where consumer pay directly for foreign ATM withdrawals are an-
alyzed in Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) and Donze and Dubec (2009) who
demonstrate that direct charging may lead to increased investment into the
network, albeit at the cost of higher fees for consumers. Wenzel (2013) stud-
ies the effects of a direct charging regime in a framework where consumers
are imperfectly informed about possible surcharges. He points out that the
success of direct charging depends largely on consumer information as sur-
charges tend to increase with the number of unaware consumers.
Given that in some countries ISOs provide quite a large fraction of the total
network, remarkably few papers address this issue. One notable exception
3We also study alternative assumptions of interchange determination. For instance, we
find that if banks set the interchange fee ISO entry has no impact on consumer surplus.
4A survey on the older literature is provided by McAndrews (2003).
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is the contribution by Donze and Dubec (2011). Motivated by the regula-
tory reform in Australia, Donze and Dubec (2011) study the impact of ISO
entry in a direct charging regime. Their paper can be seen as complimen-
tary to the present study that analyzes ISO entry in an interchange fee based
regime (such as the UK). As in the present paper, ISO entry boosts invest-
ment into the network and decreases account fees. Very different, however,
is the impact of ISO entry on bank profits. In a direct charging regime banks
may actually favor ISO entry as it decreases the incentives for excessive in-
vestment (by banks) and thereby can increase bank profits.5 In contrast,
in a regime based on interchange fees, banks suffer by ISO entry due to
increased competition on the withdrawal market which explains banks’ re-
luctance to admit ISOs to the shared network in the UK (Cruickshank, 2000).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the
model setup. Section 3 considers the benchmark model without the ISO.
In Sections 4 and 5 we consider the impact of ISO entry. In Section 4 the
ISO is financed through interchange fees while in Section 5 the ISO directly
charges consumers. Section 6 considers the welfare effects of ISO entry if the
interchange is endogenously determined. Finally, Section 7 summarizes.
Derivations are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
Banking industry
The banking industry consists of two banks and an independent service op-
erator (ISO). The two banks, 1 and 2, provide banking and ATM services.
The costs for providing these services are normalized to zero.6 Banks are
differentiated and located at opposite ends of a unit-line (Hotelling, 1929).
Bank i can charge consumers a fixed fee for opening an account (Fi). We
consider a shared ATM network comparable to the one in the UK. That is,
there are no direct usage fees for consumers for ’on-us’ and foreign with-
drawals, which means that a customer of bank 1 can withdraw cash cost-
5Empirical evidence for these excessive investment incentives are provided by Knittel
and Stango (2011).
6Marginal costs of processing a withdrawals are typically small and thus can be ne-
glected.
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lessly at ATMs owned by banks 1 and 2, and vice versa. The only fee as-
sociated with foreign withdrawals at bank ATMs is an interchange fee of a
from the users’ bank to the owner of the ATM.
The independent service operator (ISO) solely provides ATM services whose
costs are normalized to zero. In this paper, we discuss two different regimes
the ISO may generate income. In the first regime, the ISO receives an inter-
change fee from the user’s banks and there is no direct fee for users (Sec-
tion 4). In the second regime, consumers are directly charged for the use of
ATMs operated by the ISO (Section 5).7
Both, banks and the ISO, can invest in the ATM network. The number of
ATMs owned by firm i is denoted by ni and the sum of all ATMs in the
economy byN =
∑
i ni. There is an investment cost of c for each additional
ATM.
Consumers
A mass one of consumers is located uniformly on the same unit line as the
banks. Consumers derive benefits from opening an account with a bank
and from withdrawing cash at ATMs. The utility from opening an account
(and the subsequent banking services) is V . There are linear transportation
costs at a rate t reflecting the degree of product differentiation in the market.
The second source of utility for consumers are ATM services. The gross
benefit of an ATM transaction is v, where v is a random draw of v ∼ U [0, 1].
In case the need for cash is not satisfied a consumer receives zero utility.
The total number of withdrawals of a consumer is (Nγ) and is increasing in
the size of the total network (N ), however, at a decreasing rate as we assume
0 < γ < 1. For any given transaction a consumer ends up at the ATM of
bank iwith probability niN , where ni denotes the number of ATMs of bank i.
Hence, the expected number of withdrawals per customer at bank i is niNN
γ .
The parameter γ measures the value consumers attach to a large network.
If γ is high consumers value a large network highly while the additional
benefit of an additional ATM is rather small if γ is low (Donze and Dubec,
7In practice, in the UK both regimes coexist. A share of ATMs operated by ISOs is fi-
nanced via interchange fee while another share of ATMs is financed via surcharges. For
more information, we refer to the network operator LINK (www.link.co.uk).
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2009). Upon finding an ATM consumers compare benefits and potential
costs of ATM usage and decide to withdraw if the benefits outweigh the
costs.8 That is, a consumer decides to withdraw if v > s, where s is the
surcharge an ISO may charge.
Total consumer utility if joining bank i then is:
U = V − tdi − Fi + uATM , (1)
where di denotes the distance between the consumer’s and the bank i’s lo-
cation and uATM is the utility provided by ATM services.
The following assumption ensures that the market is covered even if banks
do not provide any ATMs.
Assumption 1.
V >
3
2
t.
Timing
Competition follows the following game: In the first stage, banks and the
ISO decide non-cooperatively on the number of ATMs to deploy. In the
second stage, all fees for banking services are determined. In the third stage,
consumers decide which bank to join and on ATM use.
3 Benchmark without ISO
As benchmark we consider a banking market with only the two banks present.
As there are no costs associated with ATM withdrawals, all consumers de-
cide to withdraw money in case they encounter an ATM. Notice that the
market share of the two banks does not depend on the size of a bank’s net-
work as customers can use both banks’ networks without direct charges.9
8We implicitly assume that any further search is prohibitively costly. See also Chioveanu
et al. (2009).
9This is no longer true if consumers are charged for foreign withdrawals. In this case
consumers prefer banks with a large network adding some element of vertical differentiation
(Chioveanu et al., 2009).
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The market share of bank 1 is then
x =
1
2
+
F2 − F1
2t
, (2)
while the market share of bank 2 is (1− x).
Bank profits consist of four parts. Banks receive income from account fees
and interchange income. However, they have to pay interchange fees to the
competitor for its customers’ foreign withdrawals and bear the investment
costs:
Π1 = xF1 + (1− x)n1
N
Nγa− xn2
N
Nγa− cn1, (3)
Π2 = (1− x)F2 + xn2
N
Nγa− (1− x)n1
N
Nγa− cn2. (4)
The analysis of the model without ISO is standard. Hence, we proceed by
directly presenting the equilibrium. The symmetric equilibrium investment
level is given by:
n∗ =
1
2
(
(1 + γ)a
2c
) 1
1−γ
; N∗ =
(
(1 + γ)a
2c
) 1
1−γ
. (5)
ATM deployment decreases with investment costs (c) and rises with the
interchange fee, a.
Equilibrium account fees and profits are:
F ∗ = t+N∗a = t+
(
(1 + γ)a
2c
) γ
1−γ
a, (6)
Π∗ =
t
2
+
(
(1 + γ)a
2c
) 1
1−γ c(1− γ)
2(1 + γ)
. (7)
In equilibrium, profits depend only on account fees and investment cost. As
ATM deployment is symmetric and each bank attracts half of the consumers
interchange fee payments among banks exactly cancel out.
The benchmark model confirms the existing literature’s results on the im-
pact of the interchange fee on prices and profits. Account fees and banks’
profits rise with the interchange fee. Coordinating on high interchange fees
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can be seen as an instrument of collusion among banks. With high inter-
change fees banks have less incentives to compete tough for customers as
they can earn significant revenues from non-customers via high income
from foreign withdrawals (Donze and Dubec, 2006, 2009; Chioveanu et al.,
2009). Notice that the collusive effect on account fees is stronger the larger
the ATM network is.
Finally, we report consumer surplus in the benchmark regime. Net of con-
stants, that is, net of transportation costs and net of the gross utility V for
opening an account, consumer surplus can be expressed as:10
CS∗ =
1
2
(N∗)γ − F ∗ =
(
(1 + γ)a
2c
) γ
1−γ
(
1
2
− a
)
− t. (8)
Basically, consumer surplus is influenced by the size of the network, which
has a positive impact on surplus, and by the account fee, which reduces the
surplus.
4 ISO receives interchange fees
Now we introduce an independent service operator (ISO) that is financed
through interchange fees. As there are no direct fees for users from a con-
sumer’s point of view ATMs operated by banks and the ISO are perfect sub-
stitutes.
The profit functions of the three firms are given by:
Π1 = xF1 + (1− x)n1
N
Nγa− xn2
N
Nγa− xnI
N
Nγa− cn1, (9)
Π2 = (1− x)F2 + xn2
N
Nγa− (1− x)n1
N
Nγa− (1− x)nI
N
Nγa− cn2, (10)
ΠI =
nI
N
Nγa− cnI , (11)
where N = n1 + n2 + nI and x is given by equation (2). Compared to our
benchmark without ISO, the banks’ profit functions do only change in the
10As we do not study location and entry decisions, transportation costs are the same in all
the regimes and hence we neglect their influence on consumer surplus.
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additional interchange payments to the ISO. The profit function of the ISO
consists of the interchange income less investment costs.
In the second stage of the game, banks decide on their account fees. The ISO
has no decision variable at this stage. Maximizing banks’ profit functions
and solving for equilibrium account fees we get:
Fˆi = t+
(n1
N
Nγ +
n2
N
Nγ +
nI
N
Nγ
)
a = t+Nγa. (12)
Notice that the costs the ISO incurs onto banks (nIN N
γa) are fully passed
through to customers via higher account fees. Again both banks charge
identical account fees irrespective of the size of their individual networks,
leading to profits of
Πˆi =
t
2
+
ni
N
Nγa− cni. (13)
At the investment decision in stage 1 banks aim to maximize equation (13).
The profit function for the ISO at this stage is given by equation (11). The
symmetric equilibrium is characterized by:11
n¯ =
1
3
[
(2 + γ)a
3c
] 1
1−γ
; N¯ =
[
(2 + γ)a
3c
] 1
1−γ
. (14)
Comparing ATM deployment with and without ISO we find that n¯ < n∗
and N¯ > N∗. That is, due to ISO entry each bank reduces its network size,
however, the total size of the ATM network becomes larger.
The resulting equilibrium account fees are:
F¯ = t+ N¯a = t+
(
(2 + γ)a
3c
) γ
1−γ
a. (15)
Comparing equations (15) and (6) and knowing that N¯ > N∗ it is clear that
the account fees rise due to the entry of the ISO. The reason lies in the ad-
ditional ATM investment by the entering ISO. A larger ATM network of the
11The objective functions of all players—banks and ISO—take the form of a Tullock contest
where the identical contest price increases with aggregate investment and we know from
Chung (1996) that a symmetric equilibrium exists. Note that the equilibrium is symmetric
as all interchange fee payments are fully passed through to customers via higher account
fees.
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ISO incurs costs to the banks which pass them through to their customers.
Equilibrium bank profits are:
Π¯B =
t
2
+
(
(2 + γ)a
3c
) 1
1−γ c(1− γ)
3(2 + γ)
. (16)
In equilibrium, bank profits consist of three parts: Banks receive account
fees from consumers. The interchange fee flows between banks again net
out while both banks have an interchange outflow to the ISO. In addition,
banks have to bear the investment costs for their network. Comparing prof-
its before and after ISO entry (comparing equations (7) and (16)) we find
that bank profits decrease due to the entry of the ISO (Π¯B < Π∗).
The ISO earns the following profits:
Π¯I =
(
(2 + γ)a
3c
) 1
1−γ c(1− γ)
3(2 + γ)
. (17)
Both, banks and the ISO, prefer high interchange fees as profits rise with
the interchange fee. Thus, the collusive impact of interchange fees from the
benchmark case is confirmed in the case where the ISO receives interchange
fees.
We study whether the entry of an ISO that receives interchange fees is ben-
eficial for consumers. Net of constants, consumer surplus in the regime
where the ISO receives interchange fees is:
C¯S =
1
2
N¯γ − F¯ =
(
(2 + γ)a
3c
) γ
1−γ
(
1
2
− a
)
− t. (18)
Comparing equations (8) and (18), there are two effects of ISO entry on
consumer surplus. On the positive side, the entry of the ISO leads to a
larger total ATM network which is beneficial for consumers. On the neg-
ative side, account fees increase. Thus, the total impact on consumers de-
pends on the relative strength of these two effects. The comparison reveals
that C¯S > CS∗ as long as a < 12 . Hence, the entry of the ISO need not be
good for consumers as the increase in account fees may outweigh the posi-
tive benefits of the larger network which is the case if the interchange fee is
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sufficiently large.
The following proposition summarizes the impact of entry by an ISO re-
ceiving interchange fees:
Proposition 1. The entry of an ISO which is financed through interchange
fees leads to i) a larger total ATM network, ii) a smaller network operated
by banks, iii) higher account fees, and iv) lower bank profits. v) Consumer
surplus increases if the (exogenous) interchange fee is sufficiently small.
5 ISO receives surcharges
In this section, we consider the regime where the ISO directly charges cus-
tomers for cash withdrawals. Foreign withdrawals at bank ATMs are still
costless.
In contrast to the above sections, not all ATMs can be used without charges
and, hence, not all consumers decide to withdraw money once they en-
counter an ATM. Suppose the ISO charges a fee of sI < 1, then only con-
sumers with v > sI decide to withdraw money. Under the assumption of
v being uniformly distributed on the unit interval, a fraction (1 − sI) uses
the ATM. Hence, the ISO generates revenues of (1 − sI)sI . As all with-
drawals at bank ATMs are still costless, all consumers decide to withdraw
at bank ATMs. Notice that with positive surcharges ATM consumption is
inefficiently low.
The profit functions are now:
Π1 = xF1 + (1− x)n1
N
Nγa− xn2
N
Nγa− cn1, (19)
Π2 = (1− x)F2 + xn2
N
Nγa− (1− x)n1
N
Nγa− cn2, (20)
ΠI =
nI
N
Nγ (1− sI) sI − cnI , (21)
where N = n1 + n2 + nI and x is given by equation (2).
In the second stage, fees for all banking services are set: The banks decide
on account fees (F1, F2), the ISO decides on the surcharge (sI ). Decisions of
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the banks and the ISO are independent and hence,
s˘I =
1
2
, (22)
and
F˘ = t+
n1 + n2
N
Nγa. (23)
Inserting these fees gives the profits at the investment stage:
Π˘B =
t
2
+
ni
N
Nγa− cni, (24)
and
Π˘I =
nI
N
Nγ
1
4
− cnI . (25)
The objective functions of the players at the investment stage resemble a
contest with market size effects. However, in contrast to the preceding sec-
tion valuations of the contest price are asymmetric. Banks value an addi-
tional ATM by a and the ISO by 14 . As has been shown in the literature
on asymmetric contests equilibrium investment is no longer symmetric. In
particular, not all players are necessarily active, that is, some players may
not invest at all (e.g., Stein, 2002). In the Appendix, we consider a general
setup where contestants are asymmetric and the contest prize is increasing
in aggregate effort. In this setup we derive the set of active players and then
provide the solution to our specific investment problem.
Equilibrium ATM investment is as follows:
n˜B =

0 if a < γ4
4a−γ
2(1+2a)(1−γ)
(
a(2+γ)
2c(1+2a)
) 1
1−γ if γ4 ≤ a ≤ 12(1+γ)
1
2
(
(1+γ)a
2c
) 1
1−γ if a > 12(1+γ) ,
(26)
n˜I =

( γ
4c
) 1
1−γ if a < γ4
1−2a(1+γ)
(1+2a)(1−γ)
(
a(2+γ)
2c(1+2a)
) 1
1−γ if γ4 ≤ a ≤ 12(1+γ)
0 if a > 12(1+γ) .
(27)
Equilibrium investment is asymmetric and there are three different cases
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depending on the magnitude of the interchange fee: i) if the interchange
fee is low (a < γ4 ) banks do not invest at all. Only the ISO invests; ii) if the
interchange fee is intermediate (γ4 ≤ a ≤ 12(1+γ) ), both types of firm invest
positive amounts; and iii) if the interchange fee is high (a > 12(1+γ) ), then
only banks invest a positive amount. In this case, the outcome corresponds
to our benchmark case without ISO.
Our model points to a novel rationale for banks to coordinate on high in-
terchange fees. While the existing theory focuses on the collusive impact of
high interchange fees, the present model shows that high interchange fees
may additionally serve as a device to deter entry of non-banks. The reason
is that with high interchange fees banks high investment crowds out any
investment by the ISO.12
In the following we will focus on cases where the ISO is active, that is, a <
1
2(1+γ) . The results for an inactive ISO correspond to our benchmark case
from Section 3. Adding up, the total size of the ATM network is:
N˜ =

( γ
4c
) 1
1−γ if a < γ4(
a(2+γ)
2c(1+2a)
) 1
1−γ if γ4 ≤ a ≤ 12(1+γ) .
(28)
While an increase in the interchange fee changes the composition of the
share of the ATM network owned by banks and the ISO, the size of the
overall network strictly increases. The increase in banks’ network more than
compensates possible decreases in investment by the ISO.
Equilibrium account fees are given by F˜ = t+ a2N˜B
N˜
N˜γ :
F˜ =
t if a <
γ
4
t+ a(4a−γ)(1−γ)(1+2a)
(
a(2+γ)
2c(1+2a)
) γ
1−γ if γ4 ≤ a ≤ 12(1+γ) .
(29)
Account fees with direct charging are lower than in the benchmark model
as well as in the regime where the ISO receives interchange fees as the col-
lusive impact of interchange fees, which depends on the market share of
12A similar case can be made when the ISO receives interchange fees, but interchange fees
for banks and the ISO differ. If the interchange fee among banks is sufficiently higher than
the interchange fee received by the ISO the same outcome would emerge.
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banks in the ATM network, is lower. In addition, no costs in form of in-
terchange payments to the ISO are passed over to consumers. This is easy
to see in the case where only the ISO invests in the ATM network. In this
case the markets for banking and withdrawal services are unconnected and
account fees are only determined by the degree of product differentiation
and hence correspond to the standard Hotelling price of t. The same quali-
tatively holds, though less pronounced, for the case where both banks and
the ISO invest. Account fees are proportional to the market share of banks
in the ATM market (see equation (23)) which decreases due to the entry of
the ISO.
In equilibrium, profits of banks and the ISO are:
Π˜B =

t
2 if a <
γ
4
t
2 +
(
a(2+γ)
2c(1+2a)
) 1
1−γ (4a−γ)2c
2(1+2a)(1−γ)(2+γ) if
γ
4 ≤ a ≤ 12(1+γ) .
(30)
Π˜I =

( γ
4c
) 1
1−γ c(1−γ)
γ if a <
γ
4(
a(2+γ)
2c(1+2a)
) 1
1−γ c(1−2a(1+γ))2
2a(2+γ)(1−γ)(1+2a) if
γ
4 ≤ a ≤ 12(1+γ) .
(31)
Bank profits are lower than in the base model, that is Π˜B < Π∗. This can
again best be seen when banks do not invest. Then, profits reduce to the
standard Hotelling profits. Thus, irrespective of the way the ISO receives
income banks lose profits if the ISO enters. This explains the reluctance
of ATM network operators—who are traditionally dominated by banks—to
allow ISOs to become members of a shared network (Cruickshank, 2000).
Now let us compare whether the entry of a surcharging ISO is beneficial for
consumers. Consumer surplus in the surcharging case is given by:
C˜S = N˜γ
(
n˜I
N˜
(1− sI)2)
2
+
2n˜B
N˜
1
2
)
− F˜ . (32)
Consumer surplus consists of benefits from using an ATM owned by the ISO
(first term in brackets), benefits of using an ATM owned by a banks (second
term in brackets) and the payment of account fees. Using equations (26) and
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(27) consumer surplus can be rewritten as
C˜S =

1
8
( γ
4c
) γ
1−γ − t if a < γ4(
a(2+γ)
2c(1+2a)
) γ
1−γ
(
1
8 +
12a−3γ−8a(4a−γ)
8(1+2a)(1−γ)
)
− t if γ4 ≤ a ≤ 12(1+γ) .
(33)
Consumer surplus is affected in three ways compared to the benchmark
case: The size of the network increases and account fees decrease. Both
effects are positive for consumers. On the downside consumers pay fees
for withdrawals at ATMs of the ISO. It turns out that the overall outcome is
ambiguous and depends on the strength of the three effects. Surcharging
with ISO entry is better for consumers if the interchange fee is either at low
levels or at high levels. For intermediate levels, consumer surplus is higher
in the benchmark case without ISO. For a low interchange fee ISO entry
leads to higher surplus as the ATM network is much larger; there are only
weak incentives to invest in the benchmark without ISO. For high levels of
the interchange fee the collusive effect of the interchange fee on account
fees is the dominant effect. And hence, ISO entry—reducing this effect—is
beneficial for consumers. Consumer surplus is higher in the base model for
intermediate levels of the interchange fee as in this case the positive effects
on investment are strong and the negative effects on account fees are not
too strong. Figure 2 provides an example of this result for c = 1 and for
γ = 0.5 and γ = 0.35, respectively. From the figures one can notice that as
consumers’ preferences for a large network become more important (larger
γ) the zone where the ISO leads to higher surplus gets larger. In addition,
one can see that the difference between the base model and the case with
a surcharging ISO becomes quite small for large values of the interchange
fee, although the case with ISO performs slightly better.
We summarize:
Proposition 2. The entry of an ISO that directly charges consumers leads to
i) a larger total ATM network, ii) lower account fees, iii) lower bank profits.
iv) Consumer surplus increases if the (exogenous) interchange fee is either
sufficiently high or sufficiently low.
Let us compare our results with Donze and Dubec (2011) who study ISO
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(a) γ = 0.5 (b) γ = 0.35
Figure 2: Comparison of consumer surplus with exog. interchange fees
entry in a regime where also banks directly charge consumers for foreign
withdrawals. As in our model, ISO entry leads to a larger network and
reduced account fees. In addition, consumer surplus need not increase as
the directs costs for consumers may not be compensated. A major difference
occurs regarding the impact of ISO entry on bank profitability. While in
our model ISO leads to lower bank profits, bank profits increase in Donze
and Dubec (2011). The reason is that in a regime where also banks charge
consumers directly, banks have excessive incentives to invest in ATMs as
banks can attract more consumers with a larger network.13 With ISO entry
these investment incentives are reduced so that, as a result, investments are
reduced and profits increase.
Comparison across regimes
Let us briefly compare market outcomes in terms of network size, account
fees, and profits across the two regimes with ISO:
Proposition 3. i) The ATM network is larger (smaller) in the regime where
13This effect is not present in an interchange-based regime as consumers can use the whole
network without costs, independent of who owns it. As a result, banks cannot attract addi-
tional consumers by investing into a larger network.
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the ISO charges consumers directly than in the regime where the ISO re-
ceives interchange fees if the interchange fee is sufficiently small (high). ii)
Account fees in the regime with direct charging at ATMs owned by the ISO
are lower than in the regime where the ISO receives interchange fees. iii)
Banks and ISO have opposing preferences toward the two pricing regimes.
Results are ambiguous when comparing the network size in the two regimes
with ISO. If the interchange fee is relatively low we have N˜ > N¯ and in the
case of a high interchange fee we find that N˜ < N¯ . The reason is that for a
low interchange fee the ISO invests more under direct charging compared
to when it receives interchange fees. The contrary holds for high levels of
the interchange fee.
Regarding account fees, from Propositions 1 and 2 it follows immediately
that account fees are lower with direct charging. The entry of an ISO in-
creases account fees in the regime with interchange fees, but decreases ac-
count fees in the regime with direct charging. Hence, account fees are lower
with direct charging.
It turns out that banks and the ISO have rather opposing interest regarding
the two possible regimes and that those preferences depend largely on the
level of the interchange fee. For a low interchange fee, banks prefer the
regime where the ISO receives interchange fees as well. For higher levels of
the interchange fee, banks prefer the ISO to be financed by surcharges. This
is obvious for very high levels of the interchange fee where the ISO drops
out of the market. The ISO preferences towards the two pricing regimes are
opposed to banks’ preferences. For high interchange fees, the ISO prefers to
receive interchange fees. If, on the other hand, the interchange fee is rather
low, the ISO prefers to charge consumers directly.
6 Endogenous interchange fees
So far, we have analyzed the impact of ISO entry for exogenous interchange
fees. In this section, we study the effects that arise for endogenously deter-
mined interchange fees. In the following, we compare different ways the
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interchange fee may be determined: i) by banks, ii) by the banking industry
(banks and ISO) and, iii) by a regulator.
Interchange fees set by banks
Let us start by analyzing the impact of ISO entry in the case banks jointly de-
termine the interchange fee. This is a common assumption in the literature
(e.g., Donze and Dubec, 2006).
As shown above, in the benchmark case without ISO as well as in the regime
where the ISO receives interchange fees, bank profits are strictly increasing
with the interchange fee and, hence, jointly determined interchange fees
have a collusive effect. Hence, in both cases, banks would want to increase
the interchange fee until the marginal consumer is left with zero surplus.14
Hence, with and without ISO entry the marginal consumer is left without
any surplus and, as a result, total consumer surplus is unaffected by ISO
entry. Possible positive benefits due to the larger network are completely
offset by higher account fees.
In the surcharging regime, in addition to the collusive motive there is an
exclusionary motive to increase the interchange fee. For banks it is optimal
to increase the interchange beyond the level where the ISO is active. By
choosing high interchange fees, banks can crowd out investment by the ISO
and, hence, banks would coordinate on an interchange fee such that ISO
entry does not take place.
Proposition 4. Suppose banks set the interchange fee. i) Then, the entry of
an ISO that receives interchange fees has no impact on consumer surplus.
ii) In the surcharging regime, no ISO entry takes place.
Interchange fees set by the banking industry
Next, let us assume that the interchange fee is set jointly by the banking in-
dustry, that is, by both banks and the ISO. In the regime where the ISO re-
ceives interchange fees, incentives are well aligned. The banks and the ISO
14Notice that we still assume that the market is covered. That is, the marginal consumer
is better off buying a bank account than abstaining from buying.
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both benefit from higher interchange fees, just as banks do in the bench-
mark without ISO. Hence, in both regimes the interchange fee is set such
that the marginal consumer is left without surplus and consumer surplus
is not affected by ISO entry.
In contrast, in the surcharging regime, a conflict of interest arises as banks
and the ISO have opposing interests regarding the interchange fee. Banks
prefer a high interchange fee while the ISO prefers a low one. Hence, whether
or not entry of the ISO is then beneficial to consumers depends largely on
the relative bargaining power of banks and the ISO. At this point we can
refer to the welfare analysis with an exogenously given interchange fee (see
Proposition 2): Consumer surplus increases due to ISO entry if bargaining
between banks and the ISO leads to either a relatively low or a sufficiently
high interchange fee.
Proposition 5. Suppose the banking industry (banks and ISO) sets the in-
terchange fee. i) Then, the entry of an ISO that receives interchange fees has
no impact on consumer surplus. ii) The entry of a surcharging ISO increases
consumer surplus if bargaining between banks and the ISO leads to either
a sufficiently low or a sufficiently high interchange fee.
Regulated interchange fees
Now we suppose that the interchange fee is under the control of a regu-
lator who aims to maximize consumer surplus. Maximizing equation (8)
reveals that, in the benchmark case, the regulator wants to implement an
interchange fee of γ2 . Given this interchange fee, consumers get a surplus of
CS =
1
2
(
(1 + γ)γ
4c
) γ
1−γ
(1− γ)− t. (34)
We start by studying the entry of an ISO financed by interchange fees. In
this case, the regulator also chooses an interchange fee of a = γ2 , which
maximizes equation (18). With this interchange fee, consumer surplus can
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be expressed as
C¯S =
1
2
(
(2 + γ)γ
6c
) γ
1−γ
(1− γ)− t. (35)
Comparing equations (34) and (35) reveals that consumer surplus is higher
with ISO entry, and hence consumers benefit from the entry of the ISO.
The reason is that the regulator, when choosing the interchange fee, can
optimally balance the trade-off between investment incentives and high ac-
count fees. In addition, ATM use is at is efficient level. As a consequence,
ISO entry is beneficial for consumers.
Next, let us turn to the interchange fee determination in the surcharging
regime. In this regime, it is not possible to analytically determine the surplus-
maximizing interchange fee. Thus, we have turned to numerical solutions
to express the optimal interchange fee and compare consumer surplus with
and without ISO. Figure 3 provides the numerical results in the case of
c = 1.15 In the left panel of this figure we plot the surplus-maximizing inter-
change fee. The right panel provides the comparison of consumer surplus.
The figure reveals that consumer surplus is always higher in the benchmark
regime if the regulator chooses the surplus-maximizing interchange fee in
each regime.16 Thus, consumers are hurt by the entry of an ISO that directly
charges consumers. By regulating the interchange fee in the base model
without ISO the regulator can optimally handle the trade-off between in-
vestment incentives and high account fees and ATM use is at the efficient
level. In case of a surcharge-based regime this is no longer the case and ATM
use is too low as surcharging distorts this decision. This leads to consumers
being worse off with a surcharging ISO.
Proposition 6. Suppose a regulator sets the interchange fee as to maximize
consumer surplus. Then, i) the entry of an ISO that receives interchange
fees increases consumer surplus, and ii) the entry of an ISO that directly
15We have repeated this numerical analysis for various values of investment cost c and
find that our results do not depend on the specific value of this parameter.
16Note that the surplus-maximizing interchange fee differs across the two regimes. As
shown above, in the benchmark regime the surplus-maximizing interchange fee is set at
γ/2 and in the surcharging regime the surplus maximizing surcharge is given in the left
panel of figure 3.
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(a) Regulated interchange fee (b) Comparison of consumer surplus
Figure 3: Comparison of consumer surplus with an endog. interchange fee
and c = 1
charges consumers decreases consumer surplus.
The propositions highlights that ISO entry need not be beneficial even if
a regulator can control the interchange fee. This has also implications for
the design of ATM markets when a regulator wants to encourage ISO entry
and can also influence the charging regime. From Proposition 6 it follows
immediately that the regulator should implement the regime where the ISO
receives interchange fee as only in this case consumer surplus increases.
7 Conclusion
Since recently, entry of non-banks into the ATM business can be observed.
This paper aims at understanding the impact of ISO entry in ATM markets
(such as the UK) which are based on interchange fee payments.
Our study leads to several messages for policy makers. We show that banks’
profits are reduced due to ISO entry and, hence, banks might have incen-
tives to lobby or take other actions to impede market entry by ISOs. In this
respect, competition authorities might be concerned with how the banking
industry (or the network operator) decides on interchange fees as they pro-
vide a tool to hinder ISO entry. If ISOs are financed by surcharges, banks
may deter ISO entry by coordinating on a high interchange fees. In case the
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ISO receives interchange fees, entry deterrence can occur if banks are able
to set different interchange fees for banks and ISOs.
The Cruickshank report has advocated entry by ISOs. The present paper
qualifies this policy recommendation. We show that ISO entry need not
necessarily be positive for consumer welfare. The positive effects of ISO
entry due to larger investments into the network may be completely offset
by higher account fees (in the regime where the ISO receives interchange
fees) or by the direct charging of consumers at ATMs owned by the ISO.
However, consumer surplus can be raised by ISO entry in the interchange
fee regime provided that the interchange fee is sufficiently low. Thus, if
policy makers want to promote ISO entry this might be coupled with caps
on the interchange fee to ensure positive welfare effects. Though, in practice
it might be difficult choosing the ”correct” cap with the danger that a too
low interchange fee might reduce investment incentives.
Finally, we would like to point towards further research in this field. The
existing literature has studied the impact of ISO entry in different regimes:
This paper has studied the effects in an interchange-fee based regimes and
Donze and Dubec (2009) have provided a complementary study in a direct
charging regime. However, there has been no study that compares the ef-
fects of ISO entry across regimes in a unified framework so that the question
which regime leads to better market outcomes in the presence of ISOs is so
far unanswered.
A Appendix
Derivations in section 4
We compare the market outcomes in our benchmark case with the regime where
the ISO receives interchange fees. The total network increases: N¯ > N∗ ⇔ 1 > γ.
Bank networks decrease: n¯ < n∗ ⇔ 13
(
2+γ
3
) 1
1−γ < 12
(
1+γ
2
) 1
1−γ ; true for 0 < γ < 1.
Bank profits decrease: Π¯B < Π∗ ⇔ 13(2+γ)
(
2+γ
3
) 1
1−γ < 12(1+γ)
(
1+γ
2
) 1
1−γ , true for
0 < γ < 1. Industry profits decrease: 2Π¯B + Π¯I < 2Π∗ ⇔ 12+γ
(
2+γ
3
) 1
1−γ <
1
1+γ
(
1+γ
2
) 1
1−γ , true for 0 < γ < 1.
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Derivations in section 5
Investment
To derive the investment decision we follow Stein (2002) and Matros (2006) but
extend their setup to capture markets size effects. We provide the participation
condition in an asymmetric contest with market size effects in a fairly general way
and later apply our results to our specific investment problem.
Suppose there are K players with valuations vi for the contest prize. Player i can
expend resources ni to win the contest price
(∑K
j=1 nj
)γ
. There are investment
costs of c for investing an additional unit.
Order the players such that
v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vK , (36)
and define the harmonic mean of the h largest valuations as
vˆh =
h∑h
j=1
1
vj
for h = 1..K. (37)
When investing each player has to solve:
max
ni
ni∑K
j=1 nj
 K∑
j=1
nj
γ vi − cni. (38)
The first-order condition of this problem is:
(∑K
j=1 nj
)γ
∑K
j=1 nj
−
ni
(∑K
j=1 nj
)γ
(∑K
j=1 nj
)2 + niγ
(∑K
j=1 nj
)γ
(∑K
j=1 nj
)2
 vi = 0 (39)
The second-order condition is always fulfilled:
−
vi
(∑K
j=1 nj
)γ
(∑K
j=1 nj
)3 [2(1− γ)
∑
j 6=i
nj
+ γ(1− γ)ni] ≤ 0. (40)
25
Re-arranging the first-order condition yields: K∑
j=1
nj
γ [K − (1− γ)ni]vi = c
 K∑
j=1
nj
2 . (41)
Summing over k active players gives:
vˆn
n− 1 + γ
n
=
cN
Nγ
. (42)
Now, player k + 1 has an incentive to actively participate if
nk+1∑k
j=1 nj + nk+1
 k∑
j=1
nj + nk+1
γ vk+1 − cnk+1 > 0 (43)
Re-organizing gives
vk+1 > c
 k∑
j=1
nj + nk+1
1−γ > c
 k∑
j=1
nj
1−γ = vˆk n− 1 + γ
n
(44)
This gives the following participation condition: The active players will be the ones
with the k largest valuations. The value of k is the smallest integer such that
vk+1 ≤ k − 1 + γ
k
vˆk. (45)
This condition reduces to the same condition as in Stein (2002) in the case of no
market expansion effects (γ = 0). Note that an equilibrium with one active player
is possible. This is an equilibrium if contest valuations are such that
v2 ≤ γv1. (46)
Without market size effects (γ = 0) this cannot happen if player 2 has a positive
valuation no matter how small.
Having described the set of active players in a general way, we not turn to our
investment problem with three players. Denote banks valuation as vB = a and
the valuation of the ISO as vI = 14 . We have to distinguish the two cases whether
vB ≷ vI ⇔ a ≷ 14 : i) a ≤ 14 . Applying condition (45) we have that for a < γ4 only
the ISO is active and for a ≥ γ4 both banks and ISO are active. ii) a > 14 . Applying
(45) we have that for a > 12(1+γ) only the banks are active and for a ≤ 12(1+γ) both
banks and ISO are active. Taken together, we have that for a < γ4 only the ISO is
26
active, for γ4 ≤ a ≤ 12(1+γ) the ISO and both banks are active and for a > 12(1+γ)
only the banks are active. Solving the first-order conditions then gives equilibrium
investment as in equations (26) and (27).
Comparison ATM network size
Total investment in the regime where the ISO receives surcharges is higher than
in the base model, N˜ > N∗. i) a < γ4 . (
γ
4c )
1
1−γ > (a(1+γ)2c )
1
1−γ ⇔ γ2 > a(1 + γ),
which is true in the relevant parameter space. ii) γ4 ≤ a ≤ 12(1+γ) . ( a(2+γ)2c(1+2a) )
1
1−γ >
(a(1+γ)2c )
1
1−γ ⇔ 11+γ > 2a which is true in the relevant parameter space.
N˜ > N¯ if the interchange fee is sufficiently smaller than a < 14 . Otherwise, N˜ < N¯ :
i) a < γ4 . N˜ > N¯ if a <
3γ
4(2+γ) which is always true under a <
γ
4 . ii)
γ
4 ≤ a ≤ 12(1+γ) .
N¯ > N˜ ⇔ a > 14 = ac. As γ4 ≤ ac ≤ 12(1+γ) it follows that N¯ > N˜ if a > ac and
N¯ > N˜ if a < ac.
Comparison of account fees
Compared to the base model, account fees decrease: F ∗ > F˜ . This is obvious in
the case only the ISO invests in the ATM network (a < γ4 ). But it does also hold
if a > γ4 . To show this it suffices to show that (N
∗)γ > 2n˜B
N˜
N˜γ ⇔
(
(1+γ)a
2c
) γ
1−γ
>(
(2+γ)a
2c(1+2a)
) γ
1−γ 4a−γ
(1+2a)(1−γ) . Re-arranging givesH1 =
(
1+γ
2+γ
) γ
1−γ− 4a−γ
(1+2δa)(1−γ)
1
1−γ
>
0. We have to show that H1 > 0 in a ∈ [γ4 , 12(1+γ) ]. First note, that dH1da < 0. Then,
note that H1(a = 12(1+γ) ) > 0. Hence, H1 > 0 in a ∈ [γ4 , 12(1+γ) ]. As F¯ > F ∗, it
follows immediately that F¯ > F˜ .
Comparison of profits
Π∗ > Π˜B ⇔ H2 =
(
1+γ
2+γ
) 1
1−γ (1−γ)2(1+2a)(2+γ)(1+2a)
1
1−γ
(1+γ)(4a−γ)2 − 1 > 0. First, note that
dH2
da < 0 and H2(a =
1
2(1+γ) ) = 0. And hence, for all a <
1
2(1+γ) , H2 > 0. Hence,
Π∗ > Π˜B .
a) The banks prefer the ISO to be financed by interchange fees if the interchange fee
is regulated sufficiently low. Otherwise, they prefer the ISO to charge consumers
directly: i) a < γ4 . It is immediately clear that Π˜B < Π¯B . ii)
γ
4 ≤ a ≤ 12(1+γ) . Π˜B ≷
Π¯B ⇔ H3 =
(
3
2(1+2a)
) 1
1−γ 3(4a−γ)2
2(1−γ)2(1+2a) − 1 ≷ 0. As dH3da > 0 and H3(a = γ4 ) < 0
andH3(a = 12(1+γ) ) > 0 we know there exists a critical a¯ such that for a < a¯ it holds
that Π˜B < Π¯B and for a > a¯ it holds that Π˜B > Π¯B .
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b) The ISO prefers to receive interchange fees if the interchange fee is regulated
sufficiently high. Otherwise, the ISO prefers to charge consumer directly: i) a < γ4 .
It is immediately clear that Π˜I > Π¯I . ii) γ4 ≤ a ≤ 12(1+γ) . Π˜I ≷ Π¯I ⇔ H4 =(
3
2(1+2a)
) 1
1−γ 3(1−2a(1+γ))2
2a(1−γ)2(1+2δa) − 1 ≷ 0. As dH4da < 0 and H4(a = γ4 ) > 0 and H4(a =
1
2(1+γ) ) < 0 we know there exists a critical a¯ such that for a < a¯ it holds that
Π˜I > Π¯I and for a > a¯ it holds that Π˜I < Π¯I .
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